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PUBLIC POLICY, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND 
VENTURE CAPITAL THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper empirically examines business starts, deaths, venture capital and patents in 
relation to U.S. public policy.  The most consistent evidence in the data shows that lower levels of 
labor frictions and higher levels of SBIR awards are associated with more business starts and 
higher levels of venture capital per population.  Counter to expectations, the data indicate a 
positive impact from the homestead exemption only among the bottom quartile homestead 
exemption states, and otherwise a negative impact.  We analyze a variety of other policy 
instruments and compare the effects of policy in regular times with the financial crisis of 2008-
2010.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 A central question in entrepreneurial finance is the appropriate role for public policy for 
stimulating investment, such as venture capital, and for stimulating the creation, survival, and 
innovation (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Denis, 2004). The stimulation of entrepreneurship can occur 
through direct government subsidy programs and legislative changes that affect the institutional 
setting.  These programs are large and important around the world.  For example, The World 
Bank spent more than $US10 billion in 2001-2005 to promote small enterprises (Beck et al., 
2008).  In the U.S., government spending grew to over 45% of GDP during the recent financial 
crisis (Chantrill, 2009), a record level since WWII.  The increasing presence of government in 
stimulating entrepreneurial activity gives rise to a growing need to reexamine the role of public 
policy on entrepreneurial activity and entrepreneurial finance.  How exactly do public policy tool 
mechanisms such as government transfers, and labor and bankruptcy laws influence the rate of 
business start-up activity, venture capital finance, and innovation? How important are direct 
policy measures such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Awards and business 
incubators relative to taxation and the institutional environment?  What is the relative importance 
of the institutional setting versus direct policy instruments such as the SBIR program?  How do 
such mechanisms compare in normal times versus the financial crisis period of 2008-2010?  
 
In this paper we examine state level data over 1995-2010 to study the determinants of 
new establishment births, births – deaths, venture capital, and patents.  Our main findings 
highlight strong and consistent evidence that lower levels of labor frictions and higher levels of 
SBIR awards are associated with more business starts and higher levels of venture capital per 
population.  The data do not indicate much evidence consistent with the view that the overall tax 
burden gives rise economic harm in terms of less entrepreneurial activity.  Counter to 
expectations, the data indicate a positive impact of the homestead exemption only among the 
bottom quartile homestead exemption states, and otherwise a negative impact.  We analyze a 
variety of other policy instruments and compare the effects of policy in regular times with the 
financial crisis of 2008-2010.   
 
Our paper is at a broad level related to recent scholarship such as Lerner (2009), who has 
argued that direct government investment programs often are poorly designed and hence fail to 
meet their objectives.  Also, at a broad level our work is related to earlier work on the topic of 
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venture capital fundraising which compares venture capital to GDP (Jeng and Wells, 2000), and 
this work highlights the importance of legal and institutional setting across countries for 
stimulating venture capital investment.   
 
Our work is perhaps most closely related to scholarship that has examined differences in 
entrepreneurship across U.S. states.  Earlier work on topic based on policy measures averaged 
over 1995-1999 and outcome measures average over 2000-2004 (Xue and Klein, 2010) suggests 
the importance of a smaller public sector for stimulating entrepreneurial activity, as measured by 
an aggregation of patents, SBIR awards, venture capital, and technology establishments.  Our 
findings are consistent with Xue and Klein (2010), but in this paper, we take a somewhat different 
approach by examining a panel data setting, different outcome variables that are not aggregated 
such as new establishment births, births – deaths, venture capital, and patents, and examine data 
that includes but is not limited to the recent financial crisis.   
 
This paper is organized as follows.  The second section describes policy instruments that 
potentially impact on entrepreneurial activity, venture capital, and innovation.  The third section 
introduces the data and provides summary statistics.  Multivariate regression analyses are 
thereafter presented in the fourth section.  After the presentation of the main regressions, we 
discuss alternative robustness checks, acknowledge limitations, and consider extensions.  
Concluding remarks follow in the last section. 
 
2. Policy Instruments for Entrepreneurship, Venture Capital, and Innovation 
 
The OECD (1996) and others have argued that entrepreneurship and innovation will 
facilitate economic growth and the competitive advantage of nations in the 21st century. Much 
evidence, albeit not all, indicates small high-tech companies contribute disproportionately to 
innovation and economic growth (the World Bank, 1994, 2002, 2004).  Drivers of entrepreneurial 
activity have been extensively researched in the U.S. and internationally.  Empirical evidence 
points to a number of factors, including market conditions, education, finance, information, 
spillovers and agglomeration (Audretsch, 2007; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Audretsch and 
Keilbach, 2007; Colombo and Grilli, 2008; Bertoni et al., 2011; Fossen, 2012; Gaston and 
Nelson, 2000; Imai and Kawagoe, 2000; Wang and Wang, 2010, 2012a,b; Wang and Zhou, 
2004). Empirical evidence has likewise confirmed the role of personal bankruptcy laws to 
mitigate the cost of failure (Fan and White, 2003; Berkowitz and White, 2004, Armour and 
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Cumming, 2008), taxation to minimize moral hazard and maximize the returns to 
entrepreneurship, and legal and institutional settings that protect property rights and mitigate the 
start-up costs and costs of failure (La Porta et al., 1999; Djankov et al., 2002; Glasear et al., 2004; 
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Levine, 2005; Klapper et al., 2006; Engel and Keilbach, 2006; 
Yung, 2009; Xue and Klein, 2010; Chavis et al., 2011; Klapper and Love, 2011).   
 
In this section, we explain policy instruments pertinent to comparing the 50 U.S. states.  
Subsection 2.1 compares the institutional setting in different states in terms of the size of 
government, taxation, and labor policies.  Subsection 2.2 discusses other policy instruments 
pertinent to the institutional setting, as well as specific government expenditure programs specific 
to the U.S. context. 
 
2.1. Institutional Setting 
 
In this subsection we examine and discuss the role of government transfers and subsidies, 
takings and discriminatory taxation, labor policies, and bankruptcy law in entrepreneurship, 
venture capital, and innovation.  The next subsection discusses direct government programs. 
 
2.1.1. Government Transfers and Subsidies 
 
Arguments in support of government transfers and subsidies stimulating entrepreneurship 
require that government is well informed.  On one hand, if the government policymakers are well 
informed about the productivity across all current and potential future entrepreneurs, then 
redistributive policies with transfers and subsidies can be optimally designed to mitigate 
distortions (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003).  Transfers and subsidies not only redistribute 
between persons of different productivity but also in different states of nature.  Government 
policy can be used to bring effective education and training to an efficient level where private 
markets do not work well.  Government policy can overcome capital gaps in financing 
entrepreneurs where investors face institutional constraints on financing entrepreneurship.  
Government transfers may also provide endowments to potentially skilled entrepreneurs to 
stimulate risk taking, and facilitate agglomeration and information sharing.   On the other hand, 
arguments against transfers and subsidies for the most part are based on the premise that it is 
highly unlikely that government policymakers are well informed about productivity across all 
current and potential entrepreneurs in practice.  As such, transfers and subsidies are more likely to 
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create distortions (Xue and Klein, 2010).  The composition of government transfers and subsidies 
may induce moral hazard and adverse selection costs that mitigate the quality and quantity of 
entrepreneurial activity, thereby encouraging inefficient business creation and continuation, while 
at the same time stifling efficient business creation. 
 
In addition to government transfers and subsides, business creation, venture capital and 
innovation may be influenced by the size of government per GDP, as well as the amount of social 
security payments per GDP in each state.  On one hand, a greater government sector and social 
security payments may induce risk taking and entrepreneurial activity.  On the other hand, it is 
plausible that the size of government and social security mitigates entrepreneurship as 
governments are more likely to pursue superfluous activity as they expand (Karabegovic and 
McMahon, 2008), thereby diminishing the entrepreneurial climate in a region.  There are both 
protective and productive functions of government, and it is plausible that all of the state 
governments in the U.S. are at a sufficient size to perform the sufficient amount of both of these 
functions, and if so, this may imply that larger governments are more likely to pursue activities 
that are unrelated to stimulating business creation.  Further, social security payments for 
retirement, disability insurance and the like that are mandated by the government reduce 
flexibility and freedom of contract, thereby potentially imposing terms that might otherwise be at 
an inefficient level and in turn stifling business creation.   
 
2.1.2. Taxation 
 
 Taxation in the U.S. is progressive in the sense that higher earners pay higher tax rates.  
Theoretical work has well established the proposition that progressive taxation reduces the returns 
to entrepreneurship and induces entrepreneurial moral hazard (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2004).  
Of course, taxes which are at such a low level where the rule of law and other necessary elements 
are not in place to conduct economic activity, an increase in taxation can stimulate 
entrepreneurial activity.  But as long as taxes are at a level to cover sufficiently productive and 
protective functions of government (which is likely the case in all of the U.S. states), progressive 
taxation lowers the marginal benefits to additional effort, reduces the returns to risk taking and 
generally stifles entrepreneurial activity.   
 
 Note that taxation and government transfers and subsidies are not necessarily the opposite 
sides of the same balance sheet.  However, there are many intergovernmental transfers that break 
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the link between taxation and spending at the state level.  Therefore, it is relevant to assess 
separately taxation and spending.  Further, note that differences between corporate and income 
taxation can impact the choice between employment and entrepreneurship.  Higher corporate 
taxes relative to higher income taxes are expected to be associated with lower levels of new 
business starts (Keuschnigg and Neilsen, 2003, 2004).  We empirically assess the difference 
between corporate and income taxes in our empirical analyses. 
 
2.1.3. Labor Frictions 
 
Labor laws and the labor environment may impact entrepreneurship, venture capital and 
innovation through minimum wage legislation, the number of government employees, and labor 
union density.  On one hand, minimum wage legislation might create a social and economic 
climate that is safe, equal and fair, thereby attracting a higher number and higher quality supply 
of labor.  On the other hand, minimum wage legislation potentially discourages entrepreneurial 
activities as smaller firms have a diminished ability to afford low-skilled workers at the 
established minimum wage.   
 
 In addition to minimum wages, we assess the impact of government employment.  On 
one hand, higher levels of government employment may create economic opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to start new firms and conduct business with government, particularly where 
government expenditures enable agglomeration, for example.  On the other hand, higher levels of 
government employment may give rise to greater labor market competition in a state, thereby 
diminishing the ability of entrepreneurs to effectively start new businesses.  Further, higher levels 
of government employment could give rise to crowding out of goods and services that might 
otherwise have been provided privately, thereby stifling business creation. 
 
 Unions comprise a third crucial element of labor policy.  In principle, workers should 
have the right to join or form unions.  Well functioning voluntary unions have the potential to 
enhance working conditions and improve the climate for creating new firms.  But laws and 
regulations that mandate labor unions or the joining labor unions where workers would rather not 
potentially stifle business creation.  Factors that affect labor union density in a state include laws 
and regulations, the size of government, manufacturing density and the size of rural versus urban 
population.  Recent work empirically shows labor unions increase the cost of equity, as they 
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decrease a firms operating flexibility (Chen et al., 2011), and as such we would expect fewer 
start-ups in regions with stronger union density. 
 
2.1.4. Bankruptcy law 
 
There are many different elements of bankruptcy laws, and empirical evidence within the 
U.S. and across countries consistently supports the view that, regardless of more entrepreneur 
friendly bankruptcy laws support the entrepreneurship (Fan and White, 2003; Armour and 
Cumming, 2008) and venture capital (Armour and Cumming, 2006).  In the U.S., the most 
variable instrument in bankruptcy laws across states and over time is the homestead exemption 
(Fan and White, 2003), and as such, it is the variable that we use in our analyses.  Some states 
provide no such exemption (Maryland and Delaware), while others only protect property up to a 
certain value, and still others are unlimited (Texas, Florida, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Kansas, 
Arkansas, Iowa, and South Dakota). If the homesteads value exceeds these limits creditors may 
force the sale.   
 
On one hand, the incentives to undertake risky entrepreneurship are higher with higher 
homestead exemptions.  Note, however, that on the other hand potential agency problems are 
higher which in turn may discourage investors from financing entrepreneurs in states and periods 
with higher homestead exemptions.  With the recent financial crisis, these agency problems may 
be viewed as being more pronounced.  We therefore test these competing hypotheses over 
different time periods in the dataset, as presented starting in section 3 below. 
 
2.2. Direct Public Expenditure Programs  
 
 In this subsection we discuss other policy mechanisms that might influence 
entrepreneurship, venture capital finance, and innovation.  These include the SBIR program 
(subsection 2.2.1), business incubators (subsection 2.2.2), education and academic R&D 
(subsection 2.2.3).  Further, in subsection 2.2.4 we comment on the causal relation between 
entrepreneurship and venture capital finance and innovation. 
 
2.2.1. SBIR Program 
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The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is coordinated by the Small 
Business Administration and started in 1982.  The SBIR program awards contracts or grants to 
small businesses typically with fewer than 25 employees. The SBIR program is large.  In 1995, 
there were over $2.4 billion in SBIR awards (compared with $8.0 billion among venture capital), 
while in 2010 there were over $1billion in awards (compared with $23.3 billion among venture 
capital).  The awards do not exceed $750,000.  Awards are based on a multi-governmental 
selection process in which research potential is assessed, not commercial viability. 
 
 Academic work has show that firms that received an SBIR award are much more likely to 
subsequently receive VC funding in later years, relative to a matched set of firms that did not 
receive an SBIR award (Lerner, 1999).  Moreover, Lerner shows that SBIR awardees also have 
higher sales and asset growth.  Lerner argues that whether or not an award is granted is more 
important than the size of the award, consistent with the certification rationale for government 
programs.  There does not appear to be an crowding out of private investment with SBIR awards, 
particularly since the funding is based on research potential, and facilitates signals of quality that 
private sector investors can use to make more informed investment decisions.  Overall, prior 
evidence on the SBIR program is highly consistent with the view that SBIR awards promote 
entrepreneurship, venture capital, and innovation. 
 
2.2.2. Business Incubators 
 
 Business incubators and advisory services are one of the most ubiquitous and persistent 
forms of government support.  Partially or fully publicly funded advisory services are 
continuously undertaken in nearly every developed country (Hjalmarsson and Johansson 2003).  
Given how long many of these programs have been in existence, it is not surprising that most 
have their origins in public policy goals of supporting SMEs.  Evidence on the success of these 
programs, however, is difficult to track due to selection and endogeneity issues, and lack of 
systematic data on outcomes from such centers (Cumming and Fischer, 2012).  On one hand, 
these programs may stimulate entrepreneurship, attract venture capital, and promote innovation to 
the extent that coaching and support services fill a needed service.  On the other hand, these 
programs may be more likely to be put into economically depressed areas and attract 
entrepreneurs that are in greater need of support.  In our current study, our question is whether 
such incubators help to encourage entrepreneurial births, mitigate deaths, and facilitate venture 
capital investing, and patenting activity.  
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2.2.3. Education and Academic R&D 
 
 Education and academic research may be related to entrepreneurship, venture capital and 
innovation (Xue and Klein, 2010).  For instance, it is possible that there are educational barriers 
to starting up a new firm (Levie & Autio, 2008).  That is, where educational levels are deficient, 
entrepreneurs will not have the necessary skills and access to information that will help them to 
start new firms.  Similarly, university or academic R&D may give rise to spillover benefits 
associated with high quality new firm creation, thereby in a pronounced way attracting venture 
capital and stimulating patents (Breznitz, 2005).  We test for both of these effects in our empirical 
analyses.  
 
2.2.4. Causal Relation between Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Venture Capital 
 
 The causal relation between entrepreneurship, innovation, and venture capital is 
ambiguous.  Entrepreneurs seek capital, and capital leads to the formation of entrepreneurs 
(Adrieu and Groh, 2012; Bascha and Walz, 2001; Jeng and Wells, 2000; Kanniainen and 
Keuschnigg, 2003; Wang and Wang, 2012a; Yung, 2009).  Likewise, patents may cause, or be 
caused by, new firm formation and new venture capital investment (Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996).  In our empirical tests we lag all of our right-hand-side variables to address these causality 
concerns as best as possible.  Also, we discuss other robustness checks for causality.   
 
Finally, we note that our theoretical discussion above and empirical tests below do not 
account for all possible variables.  Many other factors that we considered, however, do not 
significantly vary over time and/or across states.  We do include year and state fixed effects to 
account for these unobservable factors, as discussed below. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
3.1. Data 
 
Table 1 reports the definition and descriptive statistics of all variables.  We first collected 
from the U.S. Census Bureau a list of state level starts and deaths data for establishments with 1-
4, 5-9 and 10-19 employees for the period from 1995 to 2010(Q1). The data includes annual 
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births, birth rate, net change, and net rate of change of establishments for 50 states. The 
establishment data is measured at the first quarter of each year. For example, the U.S. 
establishment births of year t/t+1 are those businesses which have zero employment in the first 
quarter of the year t and positive employment in the first quarter of year t+1. Our sample includes 
800 state-year observations.  
 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
The broad public policy variables are captured by the index of economic freedom from 
the Economic Freedom of North America, published by the Fraser Institute (Karabegovic and 
McMahon, 2008). Widely used in the literature (e.g., Xue and Klein, 2010), the economic 
freedom index examines the key aspects of public policy environment. It consists of three 
primary indices: 1) Size of Government index; 2) Takings and Discriminatory Taxation index; 
and 3) Labor freedom Index. The Fraser institution calculates the value for all three variables for 
each state and year. Size of Government index measures the government intervention in the 
economy, consisting of four components including general consumption expenditures by 
government as a percentage of GDP, transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP and social 
security payments as a percentage of GDP. Takings and Discriminatory Taxation index has three 
components: total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, top marginal income tax rate and the 
income threshold at which it applies (Karabegovic and McMahon, 2008), indirect tax revenue as 
a percentage of GDP, and sales taxes collected as a percentage of GDP. Total tax revenue 
accounts for various corporate and capital taxes not included in the other three components.  
Capital gains taxes are picked up in total tax revenues, and do not significantly differ across U.S. 
states (http://www.taxfoundation.org). Labor freedom Index includes minimum wage legislation, 
government employment as a percentage of total state/provincial employment and union density. 
Our index for minimum wage is based on the minimum wage per GDP per capita.  GDP per 
capita is a proxy for the average productivity in a jurisdiction.  A higher ratio of minimum wage 
to GDP per capita reflects a narrowing range of employment contracts that can be freely 
negotiated; for example, minimum wages at 1% [5%] of average productivity likely have a small 
[large] impact on business creation. Reliable data about the quality of unions across states and 
over time is difficult; therefore, the index of labor unions focuses on overall union density, or the 
percentage of unionized workers in a state.   
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The value of each component is first calculated and then transformed into a value 
between zero and ten using the formula: (Vmax-Vi)/(Vmax-Vmin)*10, where Vmax is the largest value 
for the component in that year, Vmin is the smallest, and Vi is the observation to be transformed. 
The value of a variable is an equal weighted value of its components). The indices are a relative 
ranking. (For details, see Karabegovic and McMahon, 2008). The three public policy variables 
exhibit both cross-sectional and time series heteroskedasticity. A high score indicates a smaller 
role for government intervention. We also look into other public policy measure such as the Index 
of Economic Freedom (HF index) is published by Heritage Foundation. 1  The HF index is 
constructed at country level, making it unsuitable for our state-level analysis. Comparing the two 
measures at country level demonstrates that the Fraser index able to well capture various aspects 
of the regulatory framework and institutional environment, which might affect business creation 
and operation. The two indices overlap in their coverage and original data sources to a large 
extent – both measure government spending, tax burden, labor market regulations. The two 
government consumption sun-indices are highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.87, 
significantly at 1% level. We also observe high correlation between the indices measuring the 
difficulty of starting and operating a business. The correlation coefficient of tax burden is 0.39, 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
It is worth mentioning that there is a one-quarter lag between the business creation 
variables and public policy indices, since the former is computed at the end of the first quarter of 
each subsequent year but the latter is calculated for the calendar year. As a result, there might be a 
lead-lag relationship between the public policy indices and business establishment data 
considering the time needed for the economic policies to take effective.  Below, we empirically 
assess this possibility to allow for an additional 1 year lag (over and above the 1 quarter lag) and 
find the results to be robust. 
 
We manually collected data on direct public expenditure programs. The number of Small 
Business Innovation Research Awards is obtained from the SBIR/STTR website.2 The number of 
business incubators is available on the National Business Incubation Association (NBIA) 
                                                 
1 We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting the use of this database.  
2 http://www.sbir.gov/  
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website.3 Data on academic science and engineering R&D are drawn from the State Science & 
Technology Institute website.4 
 
The MoneyTree Report published by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture 
Capital Association report the number of venture capital deals by state on a quarterly basis, which 
are aggregated to the state level. Panel data on the number of utility patents granted are drawn 
from the United States Patent Trademark Office website. 
 
Following the literature, we control for a set of variables that are likely to affect business 
creation. The homestead and personal property exemption data are from Berkowitz and White 
(2004), Fan and White (2003), and Pettit and Platte (2011). The Tax Foundation website lists the 
top marginal corporate and top marginal Income Taxes. Data on Education, personal income and 
real GDP are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
 
3.2. Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1 indicates that the average state level establishment births decreases substantially 
in the size of the business, varying from 1,648.48 per 1 million people for business with 1-4 
employees to 147.11 for that of establishment with 10-19 employees. The establishment birth 
rates reveal the same pattern, decreasing from 16.39% for 1-4 employees to 6.12% for 10-19 
employees. The average establishment change per 1 million people, which considers both births 
and deaths,  is 83.91for size 1-4 business, while the total establishments for size 10-19 business 
seldom changes, with a an average of 4.13. The establishment change rate, exhibiting the same 
pattern, varies from 0.79% for 1-4 business to 0.17% for establishment with 10-19 employees. 
 
Table 1 further indicates that the Size of Government index varies from a low value of 
2.49 (Mississippi in 2006) to a high of 9.1 (Delaware from 1997 to 2000), with an average of 
7.02. The Takings and Discriminatory Taxation index is relatively lower. Its average is equal to 
5.92, varying from 3.54 (South Carolina in 2006) to 8.60 (Delaware in 2004). Similarly, the mean 
Labor Index is 7.12, with a minimum of 5.5 (Hawaii in 1997 and 1998) to a maximum of 8.41 
(Texas in 2007).  
 
                                                 
3 http://www.nbia.org/  
4 http://www.ssti.org  
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The average difference between top marginal corporate income tax and individual top 
marginal tax is -1.58%. The number of utility patents per 1000 people varies from 0.03 to 1.36, 
with an average of 0.24. The average state-level homestead exemption is $66,628, with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of $550,000. On average, 22.15% of persons 25 years old and 
over has a bachelor’s degree or more. The state-level person income grows at -0.14% on average.  
 
States differ in their efforts to set up business incubators to support development of 
entrepreneurial companies, ranging from 0 to 4.72 (North Dakota in 2006), with an average of 
0.91. Rhode Island has no business incubators throughout our sample period. Most states have at 
least one business incubator from the beginning of our sample period. On average, 15.34 Small 
Business Innovation Research awards are granted at state level in each year for every 1 million 
people. Massachusetts won 146.92 awards in 2002, the highest in our sample. Academic science 
and engineering R&D varies from 0 to $15.60 million, resulting in an average of 12.04. The 
average number of venture capital deal per 1 million people is 8.21; while the total dollar value of 
venture capital investment per 1000 people is $51,683.  
   
Table 2 provides comparison of means and medians tests of U.S starts and deaths data for 
establishments in relations to different levels of the three major policy indices from the Fraser 
Institute. For each index, the whole sample is classified into High or Low group based on whether 
the index value is higher or lower than its median. Higher values of each of the three indices 
imply less government intervention.  We compute the mean and median value for both groups 
and test whether there is statistically difference between them.  We show the results for new 
establishment births (Panel A), birth rates (Panel B), net changes in births – deaths (Panel C), net 
rate of change of births – deaths (Panel D), and for venture capital deals and dollars and patents 
(Panel E). 
 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
Table 2 Panel A reports the comparison results of Establishment Births per million 
population for the full sample of all state-years. The mean and median differences are positive 
significant at 1% for the high and low Size of Government index for all business sizes in Panel A, 
rates of change in Panel B, net changes in births – deaths in Panel C (with the exception of means 
and medians the 10-19 category), net rates of change in Panel D (with the exception of median 
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values), and venture capital deals and dollars, and patents in Panel E, which suggests smaller 
governments facilitate entrepreneurship, venture capital and innovation.   
 
Higher levels of the takings and discriminatory taxation index is associated with fewer 
business starts for firms with 1-5 and 5-9 employees, but an insignificant difference for firms with 
10-19 employees (Table 2, Panel A), but a higher rate of change in firms with 1-4 and 10-19 
employees and a lower rate of change in firms with 5-9 employees (Panel B).  The net change 
(Panel C) and net rate of change (Panel D) show higher takings and discriminatory taxation show 
significantly higher figures for new establishment births-deaths for 10-19 employees (Panel C), 
and higher median rates of change values for 5-9 employees, and higher means and medians for 
rates of change for 10-19 employees (Panel D).  Panel E shows the takings and discriminatory 
taxation index is significantly negatively associated with mean levels of venture capital deals and 
venture capital dollars, but insignificantly related to the median values and insignificantly related 
to patents. 
 
Finally, Table 2 shows that a higher Labor Freedom Index is associated with higher 
levels of firm establishments (Panel A), higher levels of rates of change in firm establishments 
(Panel B), higher net changes in births – deaths (Panel C), higher levels of rates of change in 
births – deaths (Panel D).  Those differences are all significant for both means and medians in 
Panels A-D.  Further, Panel E shows higher levels of the Labor Freedom Index is associated with 
higher levels of venture capital deals and dollars in Panel E for both means and medians. 
However, the Labor Freedom Index is unrelated to patents.  Less strict labor market regulations 
spur venture capital investment, consistent with theoretical models predicting that stricter labor 
policies discourage innovative activities (Saint-Paul 1997, 2002; Samaniego, 2006), and 
empirical evidence from Europe (Bozkaya and Kerr, 2013). Note that this result is consistent with 
that that reported in Sobel (2008), which considers cross-state differences for a single year 
without considering any time series variation in the data at all. In this paper we consider both 
cross-state differences as well as the time dimension in the data since new business starts, venture 
capital and patents are highly volatile from one year to the next, and as such, to accurately assess 
policy one needs to consider a large number of years and not judge policy on the basis of a single 
year.  Actually, Sobel (2008) does not report difference tests and aggregates different measures of 
the size of government together and only reports regression coefficients, do it is difficult to 
ascertain whether the results for the single year considered would actually materialize in the 
summary statistics. Regardless, in this paper we consider a full set of available years in the data. 
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Below, we assess in with the use of panel data regressions whether these results hold in a 
multivariate setting. 
 
Table 3 presents comparison tests for other policy instruments other than the Fraser 
Indices, including the homestead exemption, the number of business incubators, academic science 
and engineering R&D, and the number of SBIR awards (we do not present comparison tests for 
education for reasons of conciseness and because those tests were less often statistically 
significant).  The data indicate that the homestead exemption is positively and significantly 
associated with higher mean and median levels of establishment births (Panel A), and rates of 
change in establishment births (Panel B).  The homestead exemption is statistically unrelated to 
levels of births – deaths (Panel C) and unrelated to rates of change in births – deaths (Panel D).  
The homestead exemption is positively and significantly associated with the mean level of 
venture capital deals and dollars, as well as the mean and median level of patents, but negatively 
associated with the median level of venture capital deals and dollars (Panel E). 
 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
Table 3 further shows that the number of business incubators is negatively associated 
with the number of establishment births (Panel A), rate of change in births (Panel B), births – 
deaths (Panel C), rate of change in births – deaths (Panel D), and venture capital deals, dollars 
and patents (Panel E).  Each of these effects for business incubators is statistically significant with 
the exception of mean and median differences in births – deaths for 10-19 employees, mean and 
median differences in rates of change for 10-19 employees, and the mean levels of patents (Panel 
E).  Academic R&D is significantly negatively associated with new establishment births (Panel 
A), unrelated to rates of change in establishment births (Panel B, with the sole exception of 
positively associated with median levels for firm size 1-4), unrelated to births-deaths and rates of 
change in births – deaths (Panels C and D), but positively associated with venture capital deals 
and dollars, as well as patents (Panel E).  Finally, SBIR awards are significantly positively 
associated with new establishment births (Panel A), rates of change in new establishment births 
(Panel B, with the sole exception of firm sizes 10-19), births – deaths and rates of change in births 
– deaths (Panels C and D), and venture capital deals and dollars, as well as patents (Panel E). 
 
Table 4 presents a correlation matrix for the main variables used in the multivariate tests 
provided in the next section. The correlations are consistent with the comparison tests in Tables 2 
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and 3 discussed above.  The next section explores these relationships further in a multivariate 
context and with consideration to collinearity and causality issues, among other things.  
 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
4. Regression Analyses 
 
 Our regression analyses for the quantity of new business creation in terms of new 
business starts and business starts – deaths are presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.  
Thereafter, in Table 7 we present regressions for quality, as proxied by the number and dollar 
value of venture capital deals and patents.  By considering regressions with state and year fixed 
effects, and controlling for other things being equal, the impact of the policy instruments in some 
cases is distinct from that which is apparent from the summary statistics reported above in section 
3. For conciseness, we present regressions in levels and not rates of change.  Results for 
regressions in rates of change produced similar inferences and are available on request as well as 
available in earlier versions of this paper.  Below, we explicitly show regressions for the full 
sample, as well as separately for the financial crisis years 2008-2010.  In this section we first 
discuss the main regression results in subsection 4.1.  Subsection 4.2 discusses additional 
robustness checks. 
 
4.1. Main Regression Results 
 
In Table 5 we panel regressions with year and state fixed-effects to account for 
differences across years and states that are not picked up by our time-varying policy variables of 
interest.  Our regression models are of the following form: 
 
(1) New Business Creation / Population = f (Lag GDP / Population, Lag Size of Gov. Index 
Combining 1A/1B/1C, Lag Takings and Dis. Tax Index Combining 2A/2B/2C, Lag Labor 
Freedom Index Combining 3A/3B/3C, Corporate - Income Taxes, Lag Number of Venture 
Capital Deals / Population (*100), Lag Patents / Population, Homestead Exemption, Lag 
Education, Lag Number of Business Incubators / Population, Lag Number of Small Business 
Innovation Research Awards / Population, Lag Personal Income Growth, Lag Academic R&D 
per GDP). 
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In Table 5, Models 1 and 4 consider factors that affect the level of business starts with 1-
4 employees relative to the population in the state; Model 1 shows the full sample from 1995-
2010, while Model 4 shows the subsample in the financial crisis years 2008-2010.  Models 2 and 
5 are analogous to Models 1 and 4, respectively, with the difference being that they consider 
starts with 5-9 employees. Models 3 and 6 are analogous to Models 1 and 4, respectively, with the 
difference being that they consider starts with 10-19 employees.   We note that all of our variables 
are scaled by population in the state/year, with the exception of academic R&D which is scaled 
by the state-year GDP; the reason for this scaling is that academic R&D / population is too highly 
correlated with GDP/population to include in the same regression model.  Also, the homestead 
exemption is expressed in levels, and corporate – income taxes and personal is expressed in rates. 
In Table 6 we present regression Models 7-12, which are completely analogous to Models 1-6, 
with the sole exception that in Models 7-12 the dependent variables are measured as Births – 
Deaths.  All of the models exhibit high adjusted R2 values.   In Table 7 we present regression 
Models 13-18, which are again analogous to Models 1-6, with the exception that the dependent 
variables are venture capital deals, venture capital dollars, and patents (each scaled by 
population), and the right hand variables include similar variables as in equation (1) but also 
include lagged values of new establishments, and lagged values of venture capital deals (for the 
patent regressions) and lagged values of patents (for the venture capital regressions). 
 
[Insert Tables 5, 6 and 7 About Here] 
 
 The data are consistent with the view that higher levels of Takings and Discriminatory 
Taxation is harmful to the quantity new establishments with 1-4 employees in normal economic 
times, but otherwise generally beneficial in terms of helping new establishments, mitigating 
establishment deaths, and helping venture capital, particularly in time of financial crises.  In 
particular, the data indicate in regression Model 1 in Table 5 that there is a positive association 
between the Takings and Discriminatory Taxation Index and new establishment births, and this 
effect is significant at the 1% level.  The economic significance is such that a 1-standard 
deviation increase in the Takings and Discriminatory Taxation Index is associated with a 1.7% 
increase in establishment births relative to the mean value.  The Takings and Discriminatory 
Taxation Index is insignificant in Models 2-5, however, and negative and insignificant in Model 6 
for firms with 10-19 employees and the financial crisis years 2008-2010. Moreover, the Takings 
and Discriminatory Taxation Index is negative and significant in Models  8, 11 and 12 for births – 
deaths, where the economic significance is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in the index 
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is associated with a 1.9% (Model 8), 5.5% (Model 11) and 5.9% (Model 12) reduction in births-
deaths for 5-9 employees in the full sample (Model 8), 5-9 employees in the 2008-2010 
subsample (Model 11) and 10-19 employees in the 2008-2010 subsample (Model 12), 
respectively,  Further, in Models 13 venture capital deals in the full sample and venture capital 
dollars in the 2008-2010 subsample, respectively, a 1-standard deviation increase in the Takings 
and Discriminatory Taxation Index is significantly associated with a 12.9% decrease in venture 
capital deals in the full sample. 
 
The importance of taxes is similarly reflected in the differences between corporate and 
income taxes, which impacts occupation choice.  Higher corporate taxes relative to income taxes 
skews preferences towards employment as opposed to entrepreneurship (Keuschnigg, 2004).  In 
an earlier version of this paper with data up to 2004, we found evidence consistent with this view.  
However, the data in Table 5 indicate the opposite, which is largely driven by the 2008-2010 
years.  The economic significance is small: a 1-standard deviation increase in corporate – income 
taxes is associated with a 0.2% increase in establishment births with 10-19 employees (Model 3).  
Model 13 similarly shows a 1-standard deviation increase in corporate – income taxes gives rise 
to an increase in venture capital deals by 11.6%.   
 
Taken together, the Takings and Discriminatory Taxation Index and the corporate – 
income tax variables for the overall tax burden and the relative levels of taxation do not show 
much evidence of economic harm in terms of less entrepreneurial activity. 
 
 Unlike the Takings and Discriminatory Taxation Index, the data ubiquitously indicate 
higher levels of Labor Freedom are helpful for new establishment births, mitigate establishment 
deaths, and help venture capital deals and dollars, even in times of crises; however, there is some 
evidence that lower levels of Labor Freedom are associated with higher levels of patents.  In 
particular, the data indicate in regression Model 1 in Table 5 that there is a positive association 
between the Labor Freedom Index and new establishment births, and this effect is significant at 
the 1% level.  The economic significance is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in the Labor 
Freedom Index is associated with a 6.8% increase in establishment births relative to the mean 
value.  This effect is positive and significant in Models 3, 4, and 5, where the economic 
significance is 2.1%, 5.3%, and 6.6%, respectively, thereby indicating the effect is more 
pronounced in times of crises. Similar patterns are also observed in Models 7, 8 and 9. The 
establishment births – deaths increase by 3.5% - 7.1% for 1-standard deviation increase in the 
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index. Further, this effect is positive and significant in Models 13, 14 and 16, with the economic 
significance of a 1-standard deviation change at 27.0%, 54.6% and 25.3%, respectively, for 
venture capital deals and dollars in the full sample and in the financial crisis.  Overall, therefore, 
Labor Freedom appears to be very important to entrepreneurship and venture capital.  Also, in 
Models 15 and 18 for patents in Table 7, we note that the effect of Labor Freedom is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, with the economic significance of a 1-standard deviation change at -
13.1% and -15.7%, respectively.  We interpret this latter result as suggestive that legal conditions 
which afford greater security enable more explorative actions among firm employees, thereby 
generating more innovation (consistent with Manso, 2011). 
 
 There is mixed evidence on the value of the size of government.  The data highlight a 
negative effect of the Size of Government Index in Model 2 for firms with 5-9 employees (the 
economic significance of a 1-standard change is -2.9%).  But this effect is reversed for the subset 
of the years 2008-2010 in Model 5 for firms with 5-9 employees (the economic significance is 
6.6%).  In other words, larger governments crowd-out start-up activity in normal times, but 
facilitate start-up activity in times of financial crises.  Models 7 and 8 demonstrate that the Size of 
Government Index is negative and statistically significant for net change in business 
establishment for size 1-4 and 5-9 businesses. For every 1-standard deviation increase in the 
index, the establishment births – deaths drop for 4.6% (size 1-4 firms) and 3.6% (size 5-9 firms), 
respectively. This effect is not robust in models in Table 7. 
 
The effect of bankruptcy laws is measured by the real constant dollar level of the 
homestead exemption, and the data generally highlight a negative effect of the homestead 
exemption on new establishment births, net change in establishment and venture capital, and a 
mitigating effect on business deaths.  In particular, the impact of higher homestead exemptions is 
negative for new establishment births in Table 5 Models 1, 2, and 5, where the economic 
significance of a 1-standard deviation change is -1.8%, -1.2%, and -30.7%, respectively.   
 
Given our findings with respect to the homestead exemption differ from that reported by 
other studies such as Fan and White (2003), we considered the stability of this estimate to a large 
number of robustness checks, including for example different subsets of years, different treatment 
of the unlimited exemption states such as excluding the unlimited exemption states and the use of 
proxies for different magnitudes to reflect the economic benefit for home expenditures, exclusion 
of different explanatory variables (such as only running the regression with the state and year 
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fixed effects and the homestead exemption), and different subsets of the data for different levels 
of the homestead exemption.  The only case in which we were able to generate a significant and 
positive coefficient for the homestead exemption was for the bottom quartile homestead 
exemption states (giving rise to a sample of 156 state-year observations), for which a 
parsimonious regression with only the homestead exemption variable gave rise to a positive and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level whereby the economic significance was such that a 1-
standard deviation increase in the homestead exemption was associated with a 6.1% increase 
(relative to the mean) in the number of business starts with 1-4 employees.  With a complete set 
of variables as reported in Model 1, however, this effect was insignificant. 
 
The data show mixed evidence from the impact of business incubators.  In Table 5 
business incubators have a positive and significant effect in Model 2 (the economic significance 
of a 1-standard deviation change is 1.3%) and 6 (economic significance 10.4%), but a negative 
and significant effect in Models 4 (economic significance -4.9%).  In Model 7, 9 and 12 in Table 
6 there is a positive and significant effect of incubators (economic significance 3.0%, 2.3% and 
13.6% in Model 7, 9 and 12, respectively), but this effect is insignificant in each of Model 13-18.  
Arguably, our business incubator variable is endogenous, and relatively more endogenous to our 
other policy variables.  We discuss this issue further below in subsection 4.2. 
 
The data highlight a positive effect of academic R&D on new establishment births, but a 
new impact on births – deaths, and a negative impact on venture capital deals and dollars.  In 
particular, in Models 1, 2, and 5, for new establishment births, academic R&D is positive and 
statistically significant with the economic significance such that a 1-standard deviation change 
giving rise to a 3.1%, 6.05%, and 37.0% increase in new establishments, respectively.  However, 
the impact in Table 6 Model 12 is negative, with a 1-standard deviation change reducing births – 
deaths for establishments with 10-19 employees by 48.7%.  Moreover, in Table 7 the effect is 
also negative in Models 13, 14, 16, and 17, significant at 5% level.   
 
Higher levels of education, as proxied by the fraction of individuals with a bachelors 
degree, tend to show lower levels of entrepreneurship, except in times of financial crisis.  The 
only positive effect of education is seen in Models 4 and 5 for the financial crisis period, where 
the data indicate a 1-standard deviation increase in education is associated with a 4.6% and 3.5% 
increase in new business starts, respectively.  By contrast, the data indicate a negative and 
significant effect in Model 3 for new establishment births, but this effect is not economically 
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significant.  There is a negative and significant effect for births – deaths in Models 7-9 (again not 
economically significant) and Model 12 (a 1-standard deviation increase gives rise to a reduction 
by 15.4%), and a negative and significant effect in Model 15 (economic significance -17.8%). 
 
SBIR awards unambiguously show a positive effect on entrepreneurship and venture 
capital.  In particular, a 1-standard deviation increase is associated with a 46.5% increase in new 
establishment births for 10-19 employees (Model 3), a 28.4% increase in new establishment 
births in the financial crisis for 10-19 employees (Model 6), while a 0.18% decrease in births – 
deaths for 10-19 employees (Model 9), and a 13.7% increase in venture capital deals (Model 13), 
33.9% increase in venture capital dollars (Model 14), and a 21.4% increase in venture capital 
deals during the financial crisis of 2008-2010 (Model 16). 
 
The control variables for economic factors, including PI growth and GDP / capita, are 
significant in ways that we would expect.  PI growth is positive and significant in Model 5 and 6, 
while GDP per capita is positive and significant in Model 5, indicating more entrepreneurial 
activity in more prosperous regions during the financial crisis.  Similarly, PI growth is positive 
and significant in Model 11, and GDP / capital is positive and significant in Models 10, 11, as 
well as Models 15 and 18.  There is evidence that PI growth is negative and significant in Models 
9 and 10, and GDP / capital is negative and significant in Models 7 and 9.  One interpretation of 
these results is that low income may drive more people to start new businesses to create 
opportunities for themselves (consistent with Thurik et al., 2008).  Further examination of 
differing roles of economic conditions and possible nonlinearities is warranted but beyond the 
scope of this paper. Further, we stress that the results are robustness to state fixed effects to pick 
up factors not controlled for the in regressions but which might systematically differ across states. 
 
Finally, we note that the economic conditions in terms of patents and venture capital are 
significant.  Patents have a positive and significant effect in Model 1 for business starts with 1-4 
employees and for establishment births – deaths in Model 7 and 8.  We would not expect all new 
firms to be able to patent at an early stage or there may be delays in innovations after new firms 
start, and not all innovations take place in new firms (e.g., Cassiman and Ueda, 2006).  There is a 
positive and significant effect in Models 13 and 14 for venture capital deals and dollars, 
consistent with related work showing dual causality between venture capital and patents (Ueda 
and Hirukawa, 2008).  Venture capital deals are insignificant in insignificant in Models 1-6, 8-12, 
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and Model 15, but positive and significant in Model 18, consistent with the view that venture 
capital facilitates innovative activity (Lerner, 1999, 2009). 
 
4.2. Additional Robustness Checks, Limitations, and Extensions 
 
 Our regression analyses considered a variety of robustness checks, many of which were 
explicitly reported, others that were reported in an earlier draft, and others considered but not 
reported.  For instance, in an earlier draft of this paper we reported regressions for changes in 
levels, and the findings are quite consistent.  Likewise, we considered different possible variables 
to include or exclude, and again, the findings reported above do not materially change.  Of 
course, there are other policy instruments to stimulate entrepreneurship, such as public loan 
guarantees (Li, 2002), as well as other economic factors such as agglomeration that could explain 
state level different in business creation.  In our specifications we used state fixed effects to pick 
up state differences not captured in the policy variables considered.  Further work could explore 
differences in other factors and over time to understand the relative importance of variables not 
explicitly measured herein. 
 
 In our empirical analyses we study the period from 1995 to 2010.  We considered 
subperiods, and showed some differences in the findings in reference to the recent financial crisis 
of 2008-2010.  In the analysis of the influence of government transfers on business starts, starts-
deaths, venture capital and patents, we examine both direct governmental programs such as the 
SBIR awards program, as well as the institutional setting in different states. 
 
 Our analyses consider new establishments as our main dependent variables in Tables 5 
and 6, as recorded by the U.S. Census (Table 1).  We believe these data appropriately measure 
entrepreneurial activity in terms of new business starts, as well as entrepreneurial activity among 
smaller firms setting up new offices in different geographic regions.  We considered other data 
sources to proxy for entrepreneurship across the U.S. states and found a high degree of 
correspondence across different datasets.  Certainly an advantage of the U.S. Census data is the 
completeness, and the ability to track not only new establishment births but also births – deaths. 
 
 One possible concern is in terms of endogeneity.  We lagged our explanatory variables by 
1 year in all of our regressions to mitigate the impact of endogeneity.  Because there are a huge 
number of factors that could affect the broad governmental indices used in this paper apart from 
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new establishment births and deaths, we do not believe our indices suffer from significant 
endogeneity problems.  We have explored the possibility of endogeneity with some of the 
arguably more directly affected variables that could be endogenous such as venture capital and 
business incubators using instruments as in Samila and Sorensen (2009), but our analyses did not 
uncover any major differences in our findings.  Moreover, exclusion or inclusion of such 
variables from our regression equations does not materially impact our findings with respect to 
the other variables. 
 
In this paper we do not make claims about welfare effects (see, e.g., Schumpeter, 1934; 
Baumol, 1990; North, 1990; Irvine and Wang, 2003).  In related theoretical work, Keuschnigg 
and Nielsen (2003, 2004) find that non-redistributive taxes have neutral welfare implications, 
while progressive taxes always impair entrepreneurship and the effect on welfare is positive or 
zero, depending on the specification of incentives in the model.  Similarly, Sobel (2008) and 
others discuss the role of policy in influencing proxies for the quality of entrepreneurship, but this 
analysis is not based on time series changes in public policies and rather cross sectional analyses 
across states.  As well, prior work has not fully measured the effects of entrepreneur related 
policy changes on overall societal welfare.  Further, in this paper we do not distinguish between 
different types of entrepreneurship, such as by race or gender.  Our analyses are based on U.S. 
Census data on overall business starts and deaths.  Recent work with survey data from the 
Kauffmann foundation examines entrepreneurship by race and gender (Fairlie, 2009; Fairlie and 
Robb, 2009; Fairlie et al., 2009; Cole and Mehran, 2009). 
 
 It is noteworthy that the evidence in this paper is in sharp contrast to the findings in Sobel 
(2008), particularly in relation to the effect of government on venture capital and start-up activity.  
The reason for these differences is as follows.  First, Sobel (2008) assumes a larger government is 
one of lower quality.  The Karabegovic and McMahon (2008) indices used in this paper and in 
Sobel (2008) measure the size of government, not the quality.  Size does not imply quality.  
Second, we examine the empirics with time-series and cross-sectional data, while Sobel (2008) 
examines only cross-section data without considering differences over time.  Time series changes 
reveal important relationships between the variables, and it is widely regarded that panel datasets 
should not be estimated as cross-sectional datasets.  There are a few other papers on related topics 
that are worth mentioning in this context.  Gohmann et al. (2008) consider time series and state 
variation but with different dependent pertaining to service industries, as well as different 
independent variables.  Campbell and Rogers (2007) examine an issue that is closer related to 
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Sobel (2008) and this paper, but do not consider time series changes in index values, and restrict 
their analysis to business starts without examining business starts by different numbers of 
employees, and do not analyze patents or venture capital activity.  Therefore, our approach herein 
differs first in terms of the theoretical position that larger governments are not necessarily of 
lower quality, and second in terms of the empirical execution by making use of time series and 
cross sectional variation in the panel data.  The paper closest to our is Xue and Klein (2010), who 
study policy measures averaged over 1995-1999 and outcome measures average over 2000-2004, 
and find the importance of a smaller public sector for stimulating entrepreneurial activity, as 
measured by an aggregation of patents, SBIR awards, venture capital, and technology 
establishments.  Our findings are consistent with Xue and Klein (2010), but in this paper, we take 
a somewhat different approach by examining a panel data setting, different outcome variables that 
are not aggregated such as new establishment births, births – deaths, venture capital, and patents, 
and examine data that includes but is not limited to the recent financial crisis.   
 
In this paper we limit ourselves to the narrow question of how public policy affects 
business creation in terms of births and deaths, and the change in births and deaths over time, and 
proxies for entrepreneurial quality in terms of venture capital and patents.  Ideally, we would like 
to be able to track what happened with these new firms that started up in response to policy 
changes, and how measures of overall state welfare changed in response to policy changes.  
These questions are beyond the scope of our current data, but would be an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper empirically examines the relation between business starts and deaths in 
relation to U.S. public policy using the U.S. state level census data which covers the 1995-2010 
period.  We did not find evidence that the overall tax burden gives rise to much evidence of 
economic harm in terms of less entrepreneurial activity.  By contrast, labor frictions are 
significantly associated with lowers levels of entrepreneurial activity and venture capital, albeit 
labor frictions are associated with higher levels of patents.  SBIR awards are consistently 
associated with higher levels of entrepreneurial activity and venture capital.  We analyzed a 
variety of other policy instruments and compared the effects of policy in regular times with the 
financial crisis of 2008-2010.  These findings are robust to various controls with different 
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econometric specifications including state fixed effects, controls for economic conditions, and 
other factors.   
 
In this paper we do not consider overall welfare impacts of these policies.  Rather, we 
only empirically study business starts and deaths, and proxies for the quality of entrepreneurial 
activity.  Future work could use the new policy indices presented here in conjunction with other 
data to enable analyses of policy changes on more broadly based welfare implications associated 
with business creation. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for Control Variables 
This table defines the variables used in the empirical analyses, as well as provides the source and descriptive statistics.  The data span the period 1995-2010.  The data cover all 50 US states, so the number of observations is 800. 
Variable Definition Source Obs Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
Dependent Variable 
births_pop1 
The U.S. establishment births per 1000000 population of year t/t+1 is the numbers 
of physical locations, where business is conducted, or services or industrial 
operations are performed, which have zero employment in the first quarter of year t 
and 1 to 4 employment in the first quarter of year t+1. 
http://www.census.gov 800 1,648.48 410.95 762.01 1,576.28 3,284.88 
births_pop2 
The U.S. establishment births per 1000000 population of year t/t+1 is the numbers 
of physical locations, where business is conducted, or services or industrial 
operations are performed, which have zero employment in the first quarter of year t 
and 5 to 9 employment in the first quarter of year t+1. 
http://www.census.gov 800 262.59 85.70 104.69 266.84 549.11 
births_pop3 
The U.S. establishment births per 1000000 population of year t/t+1 is the numbers 
of physical locations, where business is conducted, or services or industrial 
operations are performed, which have zero employment in the first quarter of year t 
and 10 to 19 employment in the first quarter of year t+1. 
http://www.census.gov 800 147.11 38.53 79.68 137.58 320.47 
birth_rate1 The U.S. establishment birth rate of year t/t+1 is the US establishment births for size 1-4 of year t/t+1 divided by the US initial year establishments for size 1-4. http://www.census.gov 800 16.39% 2.81% 10.28% 15.94% 27.46% 
birth_rate2 The U.S. establishment birth rate of year t/t+1 is the US establishment births for size 5-9 of year t/t+1 divided by  the US initial year establishments for size 5-9. http://www.census.gov 800 6.84% 2.16% 2.63% 6.84% 15.81% 
birth_rate3 The U.S. establishment birth rate of year t/t+1 is the US establishment births for size 10-19 of year t/t+1 divided by the US initial year establishments for size 10-19. http://www.census.gov 800 6.12% 1.59% 3.35% 5.75% 12.78% 
Net_Change_pop1 The U.S. establishment change per 1000000 population for size 1-4 of year t/t+1 is the difference of the total establishment for size 1-4 of year t+1 and year t . http://www.census.gov 800 83.91 275.04 -1114.63 104.05 1058.33 
Net_Change_pop2 The  U.S. establishment change per 1000000 population for size 5-9 of year t/t+1 is the difference of the total establishment for size 5-9 of year t+1 and year t . http://www.census.gov 800 17.95 44.04 -136.50 17.94 187.17 
Net_Change_pop3 The U.S. establishment change per 1000000 population for size 10-19 of year t/t+1 is the difference of the total establishment for size 10-19 of year t+1 and year t . http://www.census.gov 800 4.13 24.53 -87.64 2.30 122.91 
Net_rate1 
The  U.S. net establishment rate of change for size 1-4 of year t/t+1 is the US 
establishment change for size 1-4 of year t/t+1 divided by the US initial year 
establishments for size 1-4. 
http://www.census.gov 800 0.79% 2.68% -9.16% 1.02% 9.80% 
Net_rate2 
The  U.S. net establishment rate of change for size 5-9 of year t/t+1 is the US 
establishment change for size 5-9 of year t/t+1 divided by the US initial year 
establishments for size 5-9. 
http://www.census.gov 800 0.47% 1.17% -3.49% 0.45% 5.37% 
Net_rate3 
The  U.S. net establishment rate of change for size 10-19 of year t/t+1 is the US 
establishment change for size 10-19 of year t/t+1 divided by  the US initial year 
establishments for size 10-19. 
http://www.census.gov 800 0.17% 0.99% -3.17% 0.10% 3.88% 
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Variable Definition Source Obs Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
Independent Variables  
Size of Gov. Index, Combining 
1A/1B/1C 
The index measures the government intervention in the economy as an equal-
weighted average of its three components: size_of_gov_1A, size_of_gov_1B and 
size_of_gov_1C. The index has a scale from 0 to 10, with a high score indicating a 
higher degree of economic freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 7.02 0.96 2.49 7.10 9.10 
Size of Gov. Index_1A: Gov 
Consumption/GDP 
This index measures the general consumption expenditures by government as a 
percentage of GDP. It decreases in government spending. The index ranges from 
zero to 10 with a high score indicating a higher degree of economic freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 7.16 1.30 1.93 7.41 10.00 
Size of Gov. Index_1B: 
Transfers&Subsidies/GDP 
This index measures the transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP. The index 
ranges from zero to 10 with a high score indicating a higher degree of economic 
freedom. The greater the level of transfers and subsidies, the lower the score a 
jurisdiction receives. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 8.39 0.96 1.37 8.63 9.89 
Size of Gov. Index_1C: Social 
Security Payments/GDP 
This index measures the social security payments as a percentage of GDP. The 
higher the payment, the lower the index. The index ranges from zero to 10 with a 
high score indicating a higher degree of economic freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 5.52 1.21 0.00 5.73 7.84 
Takings and Dis. Tax Index, 
Combining 2A/2B/2C 
The index measures the government intervention in the economy as an equal-
weighted average of its three components: Takeings_and_Discim_Tax_2A, 
Takeings_and_Discim_Tax_2B and Takeings_and_Discim_Tax_2C. The index has 
a scale from 0 to 10, with a high score indicating a higher degree of economic 
freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 5.92 0.77 3.54 5.95 8.60 
Takings and Dis. Tax 
Index_2A:Tax Revenue/GDP 
This index measures the total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. The higher the 
percentage the lower the index. The index ranges from zero to 10 with a high score 
indicating a higher degree of economic freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 5.82 1.23 1.83 5.86 10.00 
Takings and Dis. Tax 
Index_2B:Top Marginal 
Income Tax Rate 
This index measures the top marginal income tax rate and the income threshold as a 
percentage of GDP. The higher the percentage, the lower the index. The index 
ranges from zero to 10 with a high score indicating a higher degree of economic 
freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 5.38 1.31 3.00 5.00 8.00 
Takings and Dis. Tax 
Index_2C:Indirect Tax 
Revenue/GDP 
This index measures the Indirect tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. The higher the 
percentage, the lower the index. The index ranges from zero to 10 with a high score 
indicating a higher degree of economic freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 5.07 1.46 0.00 5.30 9.03 
Takeings_and_Discim_Tax_2
D 
This index measures the sales taxes collected as a percentage of GDP. The higher 
the percentage, the lower the index. The index ranges from zero to 10 with a high 
score indicating a higher degree of economic freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 7.40 1.04 4.48 7.40 9.85 
Labor Freedom Index, 
Combining 3A/3B/3C 
The index measures the general labor freedom as an equal-weighted average of its 
three components: labor_freedom_3A, labor_freedom_3B andlabor_freedom_3C. 
The index has a scale from 0 to 10, with a high score indicating a higher degree of 
economic freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 7.12 0.56 5.50 7.10 8.42 
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Variable Definition Source Obs Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
Labor Freedom Index_3A: Min 
Wage Legislation 
This index measures the minimum wage legislation, calculated as the annual income 
earned by someone working at the minimum wage as a ratio of per-capita GDP. The 
higher the ratio, the lower the index. The index ranges from zero to 10 with a high 
score indicating a higher degree of economic freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 7.20 0.93 4.56 7.23 9.65 
Labor Freedom Index_3B: Gov. 
Employment/Total Employment 
This index measures the government employment as a percentage of total state 
employment. The higher the percentage, the lower the index. The index ranges from 
zero to 10 with a high score indicating a higher degree of economic freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 7.55 1.35 3.07 7.84 9.80 
Labor Freedom Index_3C: 
Union Density 
This index measures the union density, calculated as the percentage of unionized 
workers in a state after adjusting the influence of government employment, the size 
of the manufacturing sector and size of the rural population. The higher the ratio, the 
lower the index. The index ranges from zero to 10 with a high score indicating a 
higher degree of economic freedom. 
http://www.freetheworl
d.com 800 6.61 1.75 2.49 6.72 10.00 
Difference Corporate – Income 
Taxes The difference between corporate and individual top marginal income tax rate 
http://www.taxfoundatio
n.org 800 -1.58% 3.52% -9.78% -1.83% 9.40% 
Patent_pop Number of utility patents per 1000 population granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office http://www.uspto.gov/ 800 0.24 0.19 0.03 0.20 1.36 
Real GDP / Population Real GDP (in millions of 2000 dollars) per 1000 people http://www.bea.gov 800 33.87 6.79 21.45 32.80 60.58 
Homestead Exemption 
The bankrupcy examption for equity in owner-occupied principal residences. If a 
state had an unlimited homestead exemption, following the methodology in 
Berkowitz and White, it was given a value of $160,000. 
Berkowitz and White 
(2004), Fan and White 
(2003), Pettit and Platte 
(2011) 
800 62,012 70,533 0 33,813 455,220 
Unlimited_Homestead_Exempti
on A dummy variable equal to 1 for a state with an unlimited homestead exemption. 
http://www.ssti.org/Dig
est/Indices/usefulstats.ht
m 
800 0.14 0.35 0 0 1.00 
Education Fraction of persons 25 years old and over with a bachelor’s degree or more (in percentage) http://www.bea.gov 800 22.15 9.52 0.00 24.20 40.40 
pi_growth Growth rate of personal income (in percentage) http://www.bea.gov 800 -0.14 3.54 -47.03 -0.11 73.11 
No_NBIA Number of business incubators per 1 million people 
http://www.nbia.org/lin
ks_to_member_incubato
rs/index.php 
800 0.91 0.76 0.00 0.77 4.72 
NBIA Dummy variable set to 1 in a year when this exists at least one business incubator http://www.nbia.org 800 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Academic R&D Academic science and engineering R&D per $1,000 of GDP http://www.ssti.org 800 637,605 834,308 0.00 375,611 5,967,396 
VCN_pop Number of venture capital deal per 1 million people 
https://www.pwcmoneyt
ree.com/MTPublic/ns/in
dex.jsp 
800 8.21 12.13 0.00 4.00 122.11 
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Table 2: Comparison Tests 
This table provides summary statistics and comparison of means and medians tests for the indices pertaining to economic freedom.  Cutoff values for 'high' and 'low' are taken at the average values of each index.  *, **, 
*** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. U.S. Establishment Births per 1 million population 
U.S. Establishment Births per 1 million population for Firm 
Size 1-4 
U.S. Establishment Births per 1 million population for 
Firm Size 5-9 
U.S. Establishment Births per 1 million population for Firm 
Size 10-19 
  Size of Gov. Index Takings and Dis. Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
Size of Gov. 
Index 
Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index Size of Gov. Index 
Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
No. of Obs. 407 393 400 400 411 389 407 393 400 400 411 389 407 393 400 400 411 389 
Mean 1595 1704 1675 1622 1621 1677 255 271 281 245 278 246 141 153 147 147 143 151 
Std.Dev 449 360 405 416 408 412 85 86 82 86 78 90 36 40 39 38 39 37 
Median 1503 1642 1601 1555 1544 1595 256 272 279 245 275 247 131 144 136 139 131 144 
Diff. in 
Means 109.20 *** -53.26 * 56.26 * 15.84 *** -35.93 *** -31.90 *** 12.40 *** 0.40   8.46 *** 
Diff in 
Medians 139.00 *** -46.11 ** 50.37 * 15.54 *** -33.52 *** -27.16 *** 13.37 *** 2.51   13.25 *** 
Panel B. U.S. Establishment Birth Rate 
U.S. Establishment Birth Rate for Firm Size 1-4 U.S. Establishment Birth Rate for Firm Size 5-9 U.S. Establishment Birth Rate for Firm Size 10-19 
  
Size of Gov. Index Takings and Dis. Tax 
Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
Size of Gov. 
Index 
Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
Size of Gov. Index Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
No. of Obs. 407 393 400 400 411 389 407 393 400 400 411 389 407 393 400 400 411 389 
Mean 15.75% 17.05% 16.07% 16.71% 15.89% 16.92% 6.55% 7.14% 7.12% 6.56% 7.09% 6.57% 5.86% 6.39% 6.02% 6.22% 5.84% 6.41% 
Std.Dev 2.44% 3.01% 2.60% 2.97% 2.49% 3.02% 1.89% 2.38% 2.00% 2.28% 1.84% 2.43% 1.34% 1.78% 1.59% 1.60% 1.46% 1.68% 
Median 15.59% 16.45% 15.80% 16.08% 15.62% 16.48% 6.71% 6.95% 6.99% 6.61% 7.07% 6.39% 5.65% 5.94% 5.63% 5.88% 5.53% 6.14% 
Diff. in 
Means 1.31% *** 0.64% *** 1.03% *** 0.60% *** -0.56% *** -0.53% *** 0.53% *** 0.20% * 0.57% *** 
Diff in 
Medians 0.86% *** 0.28% *** 0.86% *** 0.25% *** -0.39% *** -0.68% *** 0.29% *** 0.25% ** 0.61% *** 
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Panel C. U.S. Establishment Net Change (Births - Deaths) per 1000 population 
U.S. Establishment Change per 1 million population for Firm 
Size 1-4 
U.S. Establishment Change per 1 million population for 
Firm Size 5-9 
U.S. Establishment Change per 1 million population for 
Firm Size 10-19 
  
Size of Gov. Index Takings and Dis. Tax 
Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
Size of Gov. 
Index 
Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
Size of Gov. Index Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
No. of Obs. 407 393 400 400 411 389 407 393 400 400 411 389 407 393 400 400 411 389 
Mean 36.7 132.8 87.7 80.2 64.0 105.0 11.4 24.7 16.5 19.4 13.6 22.5 2.8 5.5 0.5 7.7 0.5 7.9 
Std.Dev 290.5 249.2 252.7 296.0 254.5 294.0 46.3 40.6 41.6 46.4 42.0 45.7 24.7 24.4 23.1 25.4 24.0 24.6 
Median 55.2 130.6 111.9 92.5 86.1 118.3 13.4 21.1 15.3 20.3 14.9 22.0 3.3 1.7 -1.2 6.1 -1.4 6.8 
Diff. in 
Means 96.06 *** -7.50   40.99 ** 13.35 *** 2.85   8.85 *** 2.71   7.21 *** 7.42 *** 
Diff in 
Medians 75.38 *** -19.40   32.14 ** 7.71 *** 4.97   7.05 *** -1.69   7.26 *** 8.27 *** 
Panel D. U.S. Establishment Net Rate of Change (Births - Deaths) 
U.S. Establishment Rate of Change for Firm Size 1-4 U.S. Establishment Rate of Change for Firm Size 5-9 U.S. Establishment Rate of Change for Firm Size 10-19 
  
Size of Gov. Index Takings and Dis. Tax 
Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
Size of Gov. 
Index 
Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
Size of Gov. Index Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
No. of Obs. 407 393 400 400 411 389 407 393 400 400 411 389 407 393 400 400 411 389 
Mean 0.24% 1.35% 0.80% 0.77% 0.57% 1.02% 0.27% 0.68% 0.42% 0.52% 0.34% 0.60% 0.11% 0.24% 0.02% 0.32% 0.02% 0.34% 
Std.Dev 2.75% 2.49% 2.33% 2.99% 2.41% 2.93% 1.17% 1.13% 1.05% 1.27% 1.07% 1.25% 0.97% 1.00% 0.90% 1.04% 0.90% 1.04% 
Median 0.60% 1.31% 1.06% 1.00% 0.81% 1.20% 0.36% 0.53% 0.40% 0.53% 0.39% 0.54% 0.14% 0.07% -0.05% 0.25% -0.06% 0.30% 
Diff. in 
Means 1.11% *** -0.03%   0.46% ** 0.41% *** 0.10%   0.26% *** 0.14% * 0.30% *** 0.32% *** 
Diff in 
Medians 0.72% *** -0.06%   0.39% ** 0.18% *** 0.13% * 0.14% *** -0.08%   0.30% *** 0.36% *** 
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Panel E. U.S. Venture Capital Deals, Venture Capital Dollars, and Patents 
Venture Capital Deals per 1 million people Venture Capital Dollars per 1,000 people Patents per 1,000 people 
  
Size of Gov. Index Takings and Dis. Tax 
Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
Size of Gov. 
Index 
Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
Size of Gov. Index Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index 
Labor Freedom 
Index 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
No. of Obs. 407 393 400 400 411 389 407 393 400 400 411 389 407 393 400 400 411 389 
Mean 4.28 12.27 9.21 7.20 6.980 9.50 19,687 
84,81
9 63,684 39,683 44,582 59,187 0.19 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 
Std.Dev 5.56 15.35 14.01 9.82 10.550 13.50 35,096 
150,2
29 
143,71
8 67,884 
100,13
2 
124,78
5 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.17 
Median 2.47 7.49 4.06 3.95 3.320 5.13 8167 38575 16869 15489 11993 25801 0.13 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.18 
Diff. in 
Means 7.99 *** -2.01 ** 2.52 *** 65,132 *** -24,001 *** 14,605 * 0.10 *** -0.02   -0.01   
Diff in 
Medians 5.02 *** -0.11   1.81 *** 30,408 *** -1,380   13,808 *** 0.16 *** -0.02   -0.02   
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Table 3. Comparison Tests for Other Policy Instruments 
This table presents… 
Panel A. U.S. Establishment Births per 1 million population 
  U.S. Establishment Births for Firm Size 1-4 U.S. Establishment Rate of Change for Firm Size 5-9 U.S. Establishment Rate of Change for Firm Size 10-19 
 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per $1,000 
of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research awards 
per 1 million 
people 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per 
$1,000 of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research 
awards per 1 
million people 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per 
$1,000 of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research awards 
per 1 million 
people 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
No. of Obs. 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Mean 1,553 1,744 1,700 1,597 1,725 1,572 1,550 1,747 251 274 284 241 279 246 246 280 140 154 152 142 155 139 144 151 
Std.Dev 388 412 355 455 441 363 379 419 80 89 83 84 92 75 77 90 36 40 40 37 44 31 38 39 
Median 1,498 1,642 1,636 1,490 1,643 1,518 1,491 1,681 255 279 282 240 281 254 250 281 129 145 144 131 143 131 135 141 
Diff. in 
Means 
190.9
0 *** 
-
102.30 *** 
-
153.90 *** 
197.3
0 *** 23.55 *** -42.28 *** 
-
33.20 *** 33.94 *** 13.64 *** -9.93 *** 
-
16.76 *** 7.07 *** 
Diff in 
Medians 
143.8
4 *** 
-
146.10 *** 
-
125.00 *** 
189.6
0 *** 23.42 *** -42.25 *** 
-
26.44 *** 30.82 *** 15.20 *** -13.33 *** 
-
12.51 *** 6.28 *** 
Panel B. U.S. Establishment Birth Rate 
  U.S. Establishment Births for Firm Size 1-4 U.S. Establishment Rate of Change for Firm Size 5-9 U.S. Establishment Rate of Change for Firm Size 10-19 
 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per $1,000 
of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research awards 
per 1 million 
people 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per 
$1,000 of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research 
awards per 1 
million people 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per 
$1,000 of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research awards 
per 1 million 
people 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
No. of Obs. 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Mean 16.04% 
16.74
% 
16.99
% 
15.79
% 
16.31
% 
16.47
% 
15.88
% 
16.90
% 
6.68
% 
7.00
% 7.48% 
6.20
% 
6.93
% 
6.75
% 
6.58
% 
7.10
% 
5.95
% 
6.28
% 6.42% 
5.81
% 
6.19
% 
6.05
% 6.13% 
6.11
% 
Std.Dev 2.45% 
3.09
% 2.91% 
2.57
% 3.13% 
2.45
% 
2.67
% 2.85% 
1.96
% 
2.34
% 2.19% 
1.93
% 
2.27
% 
2.04
% 
2.00
% 
2.29
% 
1.36
% 
1.79
% 1.75% 
1.36
% 
1.74
% 
1.43
% 1.59% 
1.61
% 
Median 15.77% 
16.14
% 
16.48
% 
15.46
% 
15.77
% 
16.23
% 
15.45
% 
16.42
% 
6.80
% 
6.95
% 7.41% 
6.23
% 
6.93
% 
6.82
% 
6.72
% 
7.09
% 
5.69
% 
5.87
% 6.02% 
5.59
% 
5.71
% 
5.79
% 5.87% 
5.67
% 
Diff. in 
Means 
0.71
% *** -1.20% *** 0.16%   
1.02
% *** 
0.33
% ** -1.27% *** 
-
0.18
% 
  0.53% *** 
0.33
% *** -0.61% *** 
-
0.14
% 
  -0.02%   
Diff in 
Medians 
0.37
% *** -1.02% *** 0.45% ** 
0.97
% *** 
0.15
% * -1.17% *** 
-
0.11
% 
  0.36% *** 
0.18
% * -0.42% *** 
0.08
%   -0.19%   
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Panel C. U.S. Establishment Net Change (Births - Deaths) per 1000 population 
  Establishment Net Change (Births - Deaths) per 1000 population for Firm Size 1-4 
Establishment Net Change (Births - Deaths) per 1000 population for 
Firm Size 5-9 
Establishment Net Change (Births - Deaths) per 1000 population for 
Firm Size 10-19 
 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per $1,000 
of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research awards 
per 1 million 
people 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per 
$1,000 of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research 
awards per 1 
million people 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per 
$1,000 of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research awards 
per 1 million 
people 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
No. of Obs. 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Mean 75 92 133 34 88 80 7 161 17 19 25 11 19 17 7 29 3 5 4 4 8 1 1 7 
Std.Dev 251 297 236 301 296 253 284 243 41 47 41 46 50 37 44 41 22 27 26 23 28 20 26 22 
Median 89 118 138 34 103 106 40 153 18 18 24 10 17 19 10 26 2 3 1 3 6 0 -1 5 
Diff. in 
Means 17.13   -99.00 *** -7.42   
153.4
0 *** 1.21   -14.53 *** -1.42   21.74 *** 1.68   -0.74   -6.82 *** 6.48 *** 
Diff in 
Medians 28.68   
-
103.80 *** 2.94   
113.6
0 *** 0.18   -14.05 *** 2.30   15.75 *** 1.54   1.92   -6.30 *** 6.09 *** 
Panel D. U.S. Establishment Net Rate of Change (Births - Deaths) 
  Establishment Net Rate of Change (Births - Deaths) per 1000 population for Firm Size 1-4 
Establishment Net Rate of Change (Births - Deaths) per 1000 
population for Firm Size 5-9 
Establishment Net Rate of Change (Births - Deaths) per 1000 
population for Firm Size 10-19 
 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per $1,000 
of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research awards 
per 1 million 
people 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per 
$1,000 of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research 
awards per 1 
million people 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per 
$1,000 of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research awards 
per 1 million 
people 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
No. of Obs. 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Mean 0.70% 
0.88
% 1.34% 
0.24
% 0.78% 
0.80
% 
0.05
% 1.52% 
0.45
% 
0.49
% 0.69% 
0.25
% 
0.46
% 
0.48
% 
0.20
% 
0.74
% 
0.14
% 
0.21
% 0.20% 
0.15
% 
0.31
% 
0.04
% 0.04% 
0.31
% 
Std.Dev 2.57% 
2.78
% 2.41% 
2.83
% 2.78% 
2.58
% 
2.81
% 2.33% 
1.10
% 
1.23
% 1.15% 
1.15
% 
1.27
% 
1.05
% 
1.20
% 
1.07
% 
0.91
% 
1.06
% 1.04% 
0.93
% 
1.08
% 
0.87
% 1.07% 
0.88
% 
Median 0.98% 
1.10
% 1.41% 
0.36
% 1.00% 
1.10
% 
0.43
% 1.51% 
0.46
% 
0.42
% 0.63% 
0.30
% 
0.40
% 
0.50
% 
0.29
% 
0.65
% 
0.08
% 
0.10
% 0.06% 
0.15
% 
0.25
% 
0.00
% -0.06% 
0.20
% 
Diff. in 
Means 
0.18
%   -1.10% *** 0.02%   
1.47
% *** 
0.04
%   -0.43% *** 
0.01
%   
0.54
% *** 
0.07
%   -0.05%   
-
0.27
% 
*** 0.27% *** 
Diff in 
Medians 
0.12
%   -1.05% *** 0.10%   
1.08
% *** 
-
0.04
% 
  -0.34% *** 0.10%   
0.36
% *** 
0.03
%   0.09%   
-
0.25
% 
*** 0.26% *** 
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Panel E. U.S. Venture Capital Deals, Venture Capital Dollars, and Patents 
  Venture Capital Deals per 1 million people Venture Capital Dollars per 1,000 people Patents per 1,000 people 
 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per $1,000 
of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research awards 
per 1 million 
people 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per 
$1,000 of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research 
awards per 1 
million people 
Homestead 
Exemption 
Number of 
business 
incubators  per 1 
million people 
Academic 
science and 
engineering 
R&D per 
$1,000 of GDP 
Number of 
SBIR (Small 
Business 
Innovation 
Research awards 
per 1 million 
people 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
No. of Obs. 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Mean 6.67 9.74 9.76 6.65 4.51 11.90 4.68 11.73 39,878 
63,48
9 67,824 
35,54
3 
22,09
8 
81,26
9 
24,44
6 
78,92
1 0.21 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.18 0.31 
Std.Dev 6.20 15.86 13.20 10.76 6.18 15.14 6.71 15.00 58,286 
147,9
02 
138,97
9 
75,59
3 
46,59
4 
147,0
57 
44,08
5 
148,7
31 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.21 
Median 4.55 3.43 5.83 3.09 2.47 7.09 2.63 7.36 20,979 
13,48
1 28,550 
10,78
7 6,868 
35,95
4 9,390 
34,35
6 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.25 0.14 0.28 
Diff. in 
Means 3.07 *** -3.10 *** 7.40 *** 7.04 *** 
23,61
1 *** 
-
32,282 *** 
59,17
1 *** 
54,47
5 *** 0.07 *** -0.02   0.05 *** 0.14 *** 
Diff in 
Medians -1.12 ** -2.74 *** 4.62 *** 4.72 *** 
-
7,498 ** 
-
17,764 *** 
29,08
6 *** 
24,96
6 *** 0.02 *** -0.07 *** 0.12 *** 0.14 *** 
 
 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
This figure presents correlations across the main variables in the dataset.  Correlations greater than 0.06, 0.08, and 0.10 in absolute value are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 
[1] Births 1-4 / Population 1.00 
[2] Births 5-9 / Population 0.48 1.00 
[3] Births 10-19 / Population 0.60 0.47 1.00 
[4] Births - Deaths 1-4 / Population 0.62 0.39 0.49 1.00 
[5] Births - Deaths 5-9 / Population 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.82 1.00 
[6] Births - Deaths 10-19 / Population 0.26 0.03 0.66 0.41 0.45 1.00 
[7] VC Number / Population 0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.04 1.00 
[8] VC Dollar / Population 0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.06 -0.06 0.91 1.00 
[9] Patents / Population 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.44 0.34 1.00 
[10] Lag GDP / Population 0.13 -0.22 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.02 0.28 0.22 0.25 1.00 
[11] Lag Size of Gov. Index, Combining 1A/1B/1C 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.34 0.30 0.38 0.53 1.00         
[12] Lag Takings and Dis. Tax Index, Combining 2A/2B/2C -0.07 -0.27 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.15 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 0.41 0.29 1.00        
[13] Lag Labor Freedom Index, Combining 3A/3B/3C 0.04 -0.21 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.38 0.52 1.00       
[14] Corporate - Income Taxes -0.08 -0.49 -0.21 -0.15 -0.17 0.05 -0.13 -0.16 0.00 0.42 -0.08 0.39 0.25 1.00 
[15] Homestead_Exemption 0.08 0.03 0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.14 0.09 0.09 #### 0.04 -0.06 0.11 -0.04 1.00 
[16] Lag Education 0.29 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.20 -0.10 0.33 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.36 -0.05 0.10 0.00 -0.02 1.00 
[17] Lag Number of Business Incubators / Population -0.15 -0.27 -0.11 -0.19 -0.17 0.04 -0.17 -0.17 -0.12 0.10 -0.27 0.28 0.20 0.25 -0.07 -0.19 1.00   
[18] Lag Number of Small Business Innovation Research Awards / Population 0.26 0.08 0.09 0.31 0.26 0.09 0.64 0.52 0.31 0.17 0.17 -0.03 0.02 -0.13 0.02 0.45 -0.05 1.00  
[19] Lag Personal Income Growth 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.18 -0.04 0.09 1.00 
[20] Lag Academic R&D -0.15 -0.22 -0.18 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.47 0.38 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.13 0.14 0.00 
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Table 5.  Regression Analyses of Births 
This table presents fixed effect panel regressions of the determinants of new establishment births in each of the 50 states over the period 1995-2010.  Variables are as defined in Table 1.  
Year and state fixed effects are used for all Models.    The dependent variables are as indicated in each Model.  *, **, *** significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, 
respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Full Sample 
Full Sample 
Excluding Outliers Full Sample Years 2008 - 2010 Years 2008 - 2010 Years 2008 - 2010 
US Establishment Births 
for Firm Size 1-4 / 
Population 
US Establishment Births 
for Firm Size 5-9 / 
Population 
US Establishment Births 
for Firm Size 10-19 / 
Population 
US Establishment Births 
for Firm Size 1-4 
US Establishment Births 
for Firm Size 5-9 
US Establishment Births 
for Firm Size 10-19 
 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Lag GDP / Population 1.576 0.57 0.331 0.57 0.201 0.49 24.480 3.17*** 2.469 1.87* -1.838 -1.79* 
Lag Size of Gov. 
Index, Combining 
1A/1B/1C 
-4.760 -0.28 -8.095 -2.24** -1.523 -0.60 -30.212 -0.75 14.718 2.15** -9.074 -1.70* 
Lag Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index, Combining 
2A/2B/2C 
35.713 2.68*** -0.538 -0.19 5.419 2.76*** 9.187 0.26 -5.568 -0.93 0.985 0.21 
Lag Labor Freedom 
Index, Combining 
3A/3B/3C 
196.821 6.89*** 4.108 0.68 7.780 1.85* 144.419 2.16** 27.513 2.41** 27.631 3.1*** 
Corporate - Income 
Taxes -16.262 -0.05 24.406 0.33 -6.105 -0.12 -972.378 -1.10 -52.817 -0.35 20.344 0.17 
Lag Number of 
Venture Capital Deals 
/ Population (*100) 
-0.558 -0.68 0.248 1.44 -0.062 -0.51 -0.569 -0.17 -0.175 -0.31 -0.073 -0.16 
Lag Patents / 
Population 165.193 2.88*** -16.224 -1.34 8.023 0.95 249.307 0.79 9.542 0.18 1.276 0.03 
Homestead Exemption -3.97E-04 -3.79*** -4.01E-05 -1.82* -3.79E-05 -2.46** 5.89E-04 0.48 -6.09E-04 -2.93*** -1.76E-04 -1.08 
Lag Education 0.650 0.30 -0.159 -0.35 -0.244 -0.78 4.927 2.55** 0.577 1.75* -0.521 -2.03** 
Lag Number of 
Business Incubators / 
Population 
9.977 0.83 4.805 1.91* 3.464 1.97** -80.671 -2.61** -7.086 -1.34 14.820 3.60*** 
Lag Number of Small 
Business Innovation 
Research Awards / 
Population 
0.627 1.41 0.106 1.13 -0.106 -1.61 3.691 0.92 0.971 1.41 0.630 1.17 
Lag Personal Income 
Growth 0.602 0.50 -0.139 -0.55 3.19E-04 0.00 -20.949 -1.23 6.327 2.18** 6.639 2.93*** 
Lag Academic R&D 5.99E-05 2.91*** 1.88E-05 4.34*** 7.270E-07 0.24 2.71E-04 1.59 7.79E-05 2.68*** -2.754E-05 -1.22 
Constant -721.916 -3.61*** 160.136 3.81*** 19.147 0.65 -642.967 -1.24 -131.620 -1.49 5.288 0.08 
Year and State Fixed 
Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 750 750 750 150 150 150 
Overall Adjusted R2 0.947 0.944 0.871 0.963 0.927 0.870 
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Table 6.  Regression Analyses of Births - Deaths 
This table presents fixed effect panel regressions of the determinants net changes in establishments (births - deaths) in each of the 50 states over the period 1995-2010.  Variables are as defined in 
Table 1.  Year and state fixed effects are used for all Models.  The dependent variables are as indicated in each Model.  *, **, *** significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Years 2008 - 2010 Years 2008 - 2010 Years 2008 - 2010 
  US Establishment Births-
Deaths for Firm Size 1-4 
US Establishment Births-
Deaths for Firm Size 5-9 
US Establishment 
Births-Deaths for Firm 
Size 10-19 
US Establishment Births-
Deaths for Firm Size 1-4 
US Establishment 
Births-Deaths for Firm 
Size 5-9 
US Establishment 
Births-Deaths for Firm 
Size 10-19   
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Lag GDP / Population 3.542 0.82 0.162 0.21 -0.245 -0.49 49.371 3.48*** 6.035 2.51** -1.185 -0.78 
Lag Size of Gov. Index, 
Combining 1A/1B/1C -79.768 -2.99*** -10.142 -2.12** 1.016 0.33 -100.149 -1.36 5.038 0.40 -5.435 -0.69 
Lag Takings and Dis. 
Tax Index, Combining 
2A/2B/2C 
-6.688 -0.32 -6.526 -1.75* 1.189 0.49 -27.766 -0.43 -19.384 -1.77* -11.904 -1.72* 
Lag Labor Freedom 
Index, Combining 
3A/3B/3C 
204.639 4.61*** 16.167 2.03** 9.206 1.79* 139.221 1.13 10.315 0.49 10.446 0.79 
Corporate - Income 
Taxes 11.586 0.02 28.897 0.29 96.997 1.53 -1616.660 -0.99 6.492 0.02 150.616 0.86 
Lag Number of Venture 
Capital Deals / 
Population (*100) 
-2.281 -1.79* -0.194 -0.85 -0.184 -1.24 -1.998 -0.32 -0.324 -0.31 -0.471 -0.71 
Lag Patents / Population 281.378 3.16*** 37.859 2.37** 16.664 1.61 -252.889 -0.44 -31.544 -0.32 -25.193 -0.41 
Homestead Exemption -5.93E-04 -3.64*** -1.17E-04 -4.00*** -5.97E-05 -3.15*** 1.55E-03 0.69 -1.59E-04 -0.42 1.12E-04 0.47 
Lag Education 2.842 0.86 -0.079 -0.13 -0.034 -0.09 2.040 0.57 -0.786 -1.30 -1.429 -3.75*** 
Lag Number of Business 
Incubators / Population 67.459 3.63*** 4.077 1.22 4.640 2.15** -68.228 -1.20 -0.410 -0.04 19.295 3.17** 
Lag Number of Small 
Business Innovation 
Research Awards / 
Population 
0.789 1.14 -0.032 -0.26 -0.185 -2.3** 12.074 1.63 1.823 1.45 1.234 1.55 
Lag Personal Income 
Growth -9.07E-02 -0.05 -8.53E-02 -0.25 7.51E-02 0.35 -61.976 -1.98* 11.026 2.08** 5.303 1.58 
Lag Academic R&D 4.81E-05 1.50 7.04E-06 1.23 -6.65E-07 -0.18 9.32E-05 0.30 5.77E-05 1.09 -5.80E-05 -1.73* 
Constant -1563.668 -5.035*** -66.526 -1.193 -63.637 -1.766* -1850.976 -1.95* -177.973 -1.10 66.972 0.66 
Year and State Fixed 
Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 750 750 750 150 150 150 
Overall Adjusted R2 0.711 0.628 0.517 0.668 0.588 0.630 
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Table 7.  Regression Analyses of Venture Capital Deals, Venture Capital Dollars, and Patents 
This table presents fixed effect panel regressions of the determinants of venture capital (VC) deals, dollars, and patents per population in firms in each of the 50 states over the period 1995-2010.  Variables are 
as defined in Table 1.  Year and state fixed effects are used for all Models.  The dependent variables are as indicated in each Model.  *, **, *** significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, 
respectively. 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Years 2008 - 2010 Years 2008 - 2010 Years 2008 - 2010 
VC Deals / Population VC Dollars / Population Patents / Population VC Deals / Population VC Dollars / Population Patents / Population 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Lag GDP / Population 0.036 0.29 215 0.11 0.006 3.21*** -0.273 -1.19 -320.865 -0.20 0.007 4.35** 
Lag Size of Gov. Index, 
Combining 1A/1B/1C 0.397 0.50 9213 0.74 -0.009 -0.80 -0.005 0.00 -2869.036 -0.38 0.002 0.21 
Lag Takings and Dis. Tax 
Index, Combining 2A/2B/2C -1.378 -2.29** -13742 -1.45 0.013 1.48 1.385 1.37 10412 1.50 0.002 0.32 
Lag Labor Freedom Index, 
Combining 3A/3B/3C 3.930 2.94*** 49452 2.34** -0.056 -3.01*** 3.513 1.76* 18687 1.37 -0.075 -4.41*** 
Corporate - Income Taxes 27.136 1.70* 254031 1.01 -1.858E-04 0.00 -17.296 -0.69 -44615 -0.26 -0.219 -1.23 
Lag Number of Venture 
Capital Deals / Population 
(*100)     
3.29E-04 0.63     1.05E-03 2.12** 
Lag Patents / Population 5.535 2.12** 74942 1.82* -13.313 -1.48 -2020 -0.03 
Homestead Exemption -3.13E-06 -0.65 -0.072 -0.95 6.31E-08 0.93 -4.08E-07 -0.01 -0.130 -0.56 1.32E-08 0.19 
Lag Education 0.027 0.28 430 0.28 -0.006 -4.07*** -0.096 -1.48 -333 -0.75 -0.001 -1.19 
Lag Number of Business 
Incubators / Population 0.326 0.59 347 0.04 0.011 1.40 0.233 0.26 -455 -0.07 0.001 0.11 
Lag Number of Small 
Business Innovation Research 
Awards / Population 
0.057 2.81*** 885 2.77*** 0.000 -1.01 0.661 6.17*** 4596 6.25*** 0.000 0.47 
Lag Personal Income Growth -0.057 -1.04 -503 -0.59 -2.61E-04 -0.34 0.080 0.17 -1196 -0.37 -1.01E-04 -0.13 
Lag Academic R&D -2.840E-06 -3.01*** -0.042 -2.79*** 2.049E-08 1.54 -9.560E-06 -2.02** -0.043 -1.33 1.340E-08 1.03 
US Establishment Births for 
Firm Size 1-4 4.43E-04 0.24 18.108 0.62 4.970E-06 0.19 4.53E-03 1.49 26.683 1.28 -3.443E-05 -1.49 
US Establishment Births for 
Firm Size 5-9 1.43E-02 1.67* 160.247 1.19 -1.847E-04 -1.54 -1.20E-02 -0.72 -145 -1.27 -1.001E-04 -1.53 
US Establishment Births for 
Firm Size 10-19 7.39E-03 0.58 169.330 0.84 1.179E-04 0.66 -2.08E-02 -1.27 -219.415 -1.95* -2.541E-04 -2.60 
Constant -23.276 -2.52** -355678 -2.44** 0.269 2.07** -18.129 -1.20 -121638 -1.18 0.482 3.93 
Year and State Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 750 750 750 150 150 150 
Overall Adjusted R2 0.847 0.553 0.890 0.961 0.945 0.890 
 
